Secondly, there is Syria's hostility to Israel, which has consistently seemed more implacable than that of other Arab states: Syria was the last to sign an armistice in 1949; it denounced the United Nations Security Council resolution of 1967 calling for a peace settlement; before 1967 it encouraged Palestinian guerrillas and habitually shelled Israeli fishermen and farmers on the Sea of Galilee and along the Jordan valley. Again, little attention has been paid to some of the crucial circumstances surrounding these actions, such as Israel's systematic encroachment on Arab rights in the demilitarized zones adjoining Syria.
Thirdly, Syria has had more than its share of military coups, all of which look much the same to the casual observer. Because Syria is remote and its affairs often obscure, the observer is bound to regard its internal struggles with some cynicism.
Throughout its modern history Syria has been subjected to difficult external challenges. Hopes for independence after World War 1 were dashed when the fledgling regime of Prince Feisal was expelled by a French military expedition; for twenty-five years the French then ruled Syria, separating it from neighbouring Arab territories, breaking it up internally into ethnically separate units, and forcing it to cede the territory of Alexandretta to Turkey. The whole period of French rule was marked by outspoken Syrian antipathy and, at times, armed rebellion.
Scarcely had Syria achieved independence after World War 11 than it became involved in the struggle for Palestine -a conflict from which no Syrian government could have been expected to remain aloof, in view of the high pitch of resentment at the separation of Palestine in 1920 from the natural geographic and social whole that had been Syria and its opening to massive alien immigration, culminating in the creation of a Jewish state in 1948. Arab Palestine had from the start been a keenly felt Syrian cause, as had Syrian independence itself; but now in 1948 the Syrians, though independent and possessing their own army, found themselves powerless to do anything about it, or, in the years that followed, anything about the unilateral steps of the new Jewish state to consolidate and even extend its grip on Arab lands and -as any Syrian was bound to see it -on Arab rights.
Compounding these sensitivities were others deriving from the Cold War and from the rival ambitions of various Arab leaders. The decade following the creation of Israel was marked by multiple tugs of war that threatened to pull the Syrian body politic apart. Unwelcome British and American efforts to incorporate the Arab states into the grand alliance against the Soviet bloc coincided with the efforts of the Iraqi monarchy to draw Syria into partnership, and those of the Egyptian government (both before and after the 1952 revolution) to prevent it. Both sets of pressures were intertwined with political struggles inside Syria, with rival domestic factions seeking outside support and vice versa. Not only did this process have a pernicious effect on the health of Syria's domestic politics and contribute to a series of military coups beginning in 1949, but it heightened an already considerable psychosis directed against the western powers, culminating in the 1957 crisis in which the United States, Turkey, and Iraq threatened Syria while the Soviet Union and Egypt rushed to its side. Within Syria the decisive concern was to resist any undermining of the country's independence -a threat seen to come directly from the two leading western powers and their local allies. Prodded by a group of army officers, the Syrian government therefore threw itself into the arms of President Nasser early in 1958.
If the union of Syria and Egypt was a gesture of desperation on Syria's part, it nonetheless represented a deeply felt desire in Syria to reject the embrace of the great powers. It also represented an equally strong belief in Arab unity as Syria's natural destiny, a destiny preached most insistently at the time by the Baath party but also endorsed by many more traditional nationalists. Consequently, the failure of the United Arab Republic was to become something of a continuing trauma in Syria's political outlook, and remained so long after the military coup that brought about Syria's secession in 1961. In the years that followed secession, some Syrians condemned it, others endorsed it; there was, however, widespread agreement that the union had worked badly, that the Egyptians had shown themselves to be more domineering than brotherly, that Syria would have to find its own way in defending its personality and modernizing its society -but also (here lay the dilemma) that the experiment in union, if hasty and ill-conceived, had nonetheless been a valid act of faith, a response to the moral imperative of Arabism, and that sometime in the future the project of Arab unity must be resumed on a sounder basis. In the meantime there would be ample room for recrimination and dispute, both over the question of guilt for the failure of 1958-61 and over who should manage Syria's affairs in the future. with an Immortal Mission/ they resolutely rejected the idea of co-operation with conservative regimes for the sake of Arab solidarity, and they also tended to be highly distrustful of Nasser, whom they saw as a manipulator and an opportunist. Arab unity, as a long-term goal, would only be achieved through pursuit of the class struggle on a pan-Arab basis. In conclusion, Asad has laid a foundation of policy which offers hopes of long-term success in Syria if given the benefit of a fair amount of good luck. Good luck would include, inter alia, the following: (1) good weather and good harvests, (2) the avoidance of personal slights and grievances which could stimulate factional animosities in the party or the army, (3) a minimum level of harmony in the inter-Arab arena so that Syria would not be forced to take sides in others' disputes, and (4), last but not least, avoidance of a renewed major outbreak of fighting between Israel and any Arab country or group. Given the general Arab resentment of the status quo, this last condition may be too much to hope for, but the prospects of positive steps toward a settlement seem dimmer still.
